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ABSTRACT This paper outlines how the digital currency and network technology of bitcoin
functions and explores the context from which it emerged. Bitcoin was conceived in 2008 as
an attempt to alleviate trust in government and banks which was at a low during this period of
ﬁnancial crisis. However, with bitcoin trust does not dissipate, rather it shifts. Trust moves
from trust in banks or states to trust in algorithms and encryption software. There is a move
from conventional trust in the gold standard—“In Gold We Trust”—to the trust announced on
U.S. currency—“In God We Trust”—to trust in software and networks—“In Digital We Trust”.
The hyperbole of bitcoin discourse is deemed to be an expression of the Californian Ideology,
which itself often conceals a right-wing agenda. The paper analyses the hype behind the
celebration of decentralised digital networks. It proposes that a form of network fetishism
operates here. The failure of bitcoin as a currency (rather than as a hoarded commodity in an
emergent bubble) and as an idea might be attributed to the failure to see how ultra-modern
digital networks conceal very traditional consolidation of power and capital. The rise and fall
of bitcoin, in terms of its original ambition, serves as a cautionary tale in the digital age—it
reveals how ingenious innovations that might challenge power and the consolidation of
capital become co-opted and colonised by capital. Finally, the paper offers a discussion of the
possible progressive uses of the digital technology bitcoin has facilitated.
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Introduction—bitcoin, the uberﬁcation of money
To put it simply to begin, in what was once considered apositive attribute in the rhetoric of the digital economy,bitcoin1 is the Uberﬁcation2 of money. With Uber, peers
can connect and make travel arrangements within a network
without the need for mediation with a central node (a regulated
taxi ﬁrm, for instance). Likewise, with bitcoin. Peers can connect
and make ﬁnancial exchanges within a network without the need
for mediation with a central node (a bank, ﬁnancial institution, or
government). The motivation behind the design and development
of the digital currency and its software, was to utilise the Internet
to establish a form of “peer-to-peer electronic cash system”
(Nakamoto, 2009). This would be an immaterial form of money
in which there is no need for mediation with, or trust in, tradi-
tional ﬁnancial institutions. The motto “In God We Trust” has
appeared on U.S. paper currency since 1957. Bitcoin, as a digital
cryptocurrency signals a shift in conﬁdence to “In Digital We
Trust.” Since its introduction in 2008, bitcoin has been widely
championed in some quarters as being independent of any third-
party control such as government or a central bank. Cyber-lib-
ertarians, techno-utopians, venture capitalists and others have
celebrated bitcoin as a digital currency that can challenge the
global economic order, facilitate forms of freedom, be a decen-
tralising force for good, and revolutionise everything from online
commerce to the nation-state.
On the one hand, such digital initiatives belong to a naïve
moment in the development of the Internet3 when the likes of the
Wired magazine milieu told us and sold us the coming of a
networked society, in which old hierarchical models of business
and culture would be superseded by the wisdom of crowds, user-
generated content, and an ethos of transparency and collabora-
tion. This prospect looks extremely remote just half a decade
later, and so there is a very real sense in which bitcoin is already
out of date. On the other hand, the development and operations
of digital currencies such as bitcoin, can illuminate the emergent
digital economy, its discourse, and its discontents. The digital
economy—that is, businesses that rely upon the speed and ﬂows
of information technology, the internet, and data—has a pur-
ported dynamism. As such, it is increasingly presented as a
hegemonic model and ideal that can legitimate contemporary
capitalism more broadly. (Srnicek, 2017, p 5) The apparent future
of capitalism is at hand in digital economies and bitcoin serves as
a prototype digital currency of this economy.
Bitcoin as digital money
Bitcoin is an attempt to establish an autonomous decentralised
digital currency and payment system, making online transactions
purely peer-to-peer without centralised mediation. It implements
cryptography as a means of verifying and securing online trans-
actions. A bitcoin is an electronic coin, designed and deﬁned by
Nakamoto4 (2008) as “a chain of digital signatures.” It has no
physical quality, being nothing more than an entry on a digital
ledger. When a digital transfer is made the owner leaves an
identifying signature validating legitimate acquisition of the coins
and a unique public key of the next owner. The receiver can trace
the attached signatures to “verify the chain of ownership.”
(Nakamoto, 2008) Transactions are broadcasted and then
“timestamped” to prevent double spending. External nodes, or
individual CPUs, create a peer-to-peer network that can legit-
imise transfers and stores this information in a block. A block will
contain the transaction history and a complex mathematical
algorithm. Nodes subsequently compete to solve these algorithms,
and when successful create a new block—this is referred to as
mining for coins.5 The successful node wins a new bitcoin and
this is the incentive for both the maintenance of the network and
the honesty of nodes. In this apparently anonymous6 and
decentred way, bitcoin does not rely on a central authority or
central node to disseminate and regulate the currency. The net-
work itself does this and maintains the bitcoin’s nominal value.
The blockchain is presented as an algorithmic tool to foster trust
in the absence of things like social capital, physical colocation, or
trusted third-party management. This unregulated virtual cur-
rency, issued and controlled by its developers, has stepped out of
its self-reference to be exchanged for legal tender. This is an
innovative use of digital technology and cryptology, but what
backs up the value the bitcoins seemed to have on paper?
Essentially a new form of trust: “The primary value the coins had
was the expectation that they would be worth more in the future,
allowing current holders to cash out for more than they paid”
(Popper, 2015, p 285). Should the trust and willingness of market
participants to exchange ﬁat currency for bitcoin erode and end
then this will result in the potential for permanent and total loss
of value of bitcoin. In this sense, bitcoin can be argued to
resemble a Ponzi scheme.
Money, markets, and ﬁnance, as they have evolved, have had a
crucial relationship with technology. Key moments might include
the development of writing in ancient Sumer, and the recording
of inventory and trade; the popularisation, emerging in Renais-
sance Italy, of the balance sheet and banks whereby the different
transactions in a society can be gathered together in a single
register; the invention of the central bank, with the foundation of
the Bank of England in 1694, and the subsequent development of
the right to print paper money. (Lanchester, 2016) More recent is
the change from commercial fairs to ﬁnancial markets, whereby
“the goods were not exposed anymore and the transactions (on
paper) became symbols” (Schinckus, 2008, p 1086). The Iowa
Electronic Market, created in 1988, was the ﬁrst virtual market
where all interactions took place online. In brief, this encapsulates
the broad narrative of the dematerialisation of money outlined by
Goux (1994) whereby money passes through three stages—from
gold (or metallic or material money) to paper (a representation of
money) to the era of immaterial digital and credit money. Bitcoin
is an emergent dematerialised digital currency.
The development of automatic trading and the creation of
electronic ﬁnancial products have profoundly modiﬁed the
organisation of markets and ﬁnancial exchanges themselves.
Today’s digital monies can be viewed as forms of language—or
more speciﬁcally, writing or code—in their own right. The key
analytical issues they raise are no longer principally about value
and representation—as in gold and paper money—but rather
security and encryption. As Dodd claims, “[i]t is no accident that
such concerns coincide with the era of ﬁnancialisation, in which
money has become increasingly self-referential” (Dodd, 2014: 36).
The development of ﬁnancialization,7 concomitant with techno-
logical changes, has not necessarily improved ﬁnancial affairs for
the majority. Rather it has facilitated the capitalist trend toward
monopolistic power, consolidated, intensiﬁed, and legitimated
neoliberalism, and resulted in periods of boom and bust, arguably
leading most recently to the sub-prime mortgage ﬁnancial crash
of 2008. Indeed, following the insights of Piketty (2014), wealth
and power have concentrated enormously in the era of the digital
economy, “as digital technology has spread all around the globe”
(Golumbia, 2016, p 11), precisely in the name of vague slogans
like speed, efﬁciency, connectivity, and “internet freedom.”
The context of bitcoin: the hyper-real economy and ﬁnancial
crash of 2008
The context of bitcoin is the hyper-real economy (Baldwin, 2013)
emerging from the conﬂuence of the abandonment of the gold
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standard (1971), the processes of quantiﬁcation of phenomena,
the growth of ﬁnancialization, and the realisation of the digital
society and New Economy. The latter includes high-technology
industry, business and ﬁnancial services, lending and speculation,
the media, and e-cultural industries. Bitcoin, and its blockchain
technology, is a form of dematerialised money, a pure token
devoid of any connection to an underlying material substance,
money created ex nihilo, and as simulacra without reference
to the real. With bitcoin, “money can be created out of nothing,
i.e., from within the network itself” (Dodd, 2014, p 363). Bitcoin
then, as a virtual currency in a virtual network, is thoroughly
reliant upon new digital technologies, and interestingly itself
claims to have arisen as a response and solution to the crash of
2008.
The bailout of the banks in response to the crash of 2008—a
socialist solution to a capitalist problem—is suggested to be
crucial in the impetus behind bitcoin. There may be some
opportunism here, however bitcoin was launched in a paper
published on 31 October 2008 under the name Satoshi Naka-
moto. This date was shortly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers
on 15 September 2008, and the near crash of the global ﬁnancial
system. In what is known as the Genesis block, the very ﬁrst block
of data in bitcoin, there was a concealed message stored in the
coinbase. Along with the standard data, the original transaction
also contains the message: “The Times 03/Jan/2009 Chancellor on
brink of second bailout for banks”8 This is an attempt to reference
a perceived problem with the government and banks, and make a
contrast between bitcoin and conventional banking. In launching
bitcoin as a peer-to-peer currency, Nakamoto (2009) suggests:
The root problem with conventional currency is all the trust
that’s required to make it work. The central bank must be
trusted not to debase the currency, but the history of ﬁat
currencies is full of breaches of that trust. Banks must be
trusted to hold our money and transfer it electronically, but
they lend it out in waves of credit bubbles with barely a
fraction in reserve. We have to trust them with our privacy,
trust them not to let identity thieves drain our accounts.
Trust in government and banking was at a low in the 2008
crash period and Nakamoto makes capital out of this. However,
with bitcoin trust does not dissipate, rather it shifts. Trust moves
from trust in banks or states to trust in algorithms and encryption
software.9 There is a move from conventional trust in the gold
standard—“In Gold We Trust,” to the trust announced on U.S.
currency—“In God We Trust,” to trust in software and networks
—“In Digital We Trust.” This signals a fundamental shift in
digital culture.
Bitcoin discourse
The trust and belief in bitcoin as a remedy to purported problems
with traditional ﬁnance has been reﬂected in the popular dis-
course around bitcoin. There is hyperbole, half-truth, and exci-
tement here and much blurring in this discourse between bitcoin
as currency, bitcoin as technology, bitcoin as the free market
realised, bitcoin as commodity, bitcoin as investment, crypto-
currency as in bitcoin, cryptocurrency in general, the blockchain
as in bitcoin, or the blockchain as in general. Digital discussion is
discomfortingly reliant on the Californian Ideology and business,
journalistic, investor, and enthusiast commentary regarding the
apparent utopian impact of digital technologies on economies
and societies in the twenty ﬁrst century. This discourse is not
disinterested. As Fisher suggests, “the discourse on technology is
not a transparent vignette on reality but rather a particular out-
look on it…technology not only constitutes the material foun-
dations of modern societies but also functions as its legitimation”
(Fisher, 2010, p 2). A trading ﬁrm research analyst has announced
that, “[w]e see the intrinsic value of Bitcoin as the conduit in a
new global crowd-funded open-source payment network” (in
Popper, 2015, p 347). Bitcoin has been described, by various
enthusiasts, as “the internet of money” (Popper, 2015, p 430) and
the “ﬁrst online currency based on highly distributed trust”
(Popper, 2015, p 434). Somewhat immodest claims have been
made on behalf of the possibilities of bitcoin: It “will replace the
current ﬁnancial system” (Falkvinge in Golumbia, 2016, p 81); it
is to money what the Internet was to property, “with Bitcoin
giving people control over their money and trade again, [there is]
the potential for a monumental shift in the power structure of the
world” (Barber, 2015); and it is posited “as the new First
Amendment app” (Falkvinge in Golumbia, 2016, p 67). It is
announced that the bitcoin “blockchain is as revolutionary today
as were personal computers in 1975, and the internet in 1993”
(Andreessen in Golumbia, 2016, p 87). One early adopter excit-
edly exclaimed that it is, “the ﬁrst thing I know where you can
both get rich and change the world” (Voorhees in Popper, 2015, p
9). Bitcoins are “the most important invention since the internet
itself. They will change the way the entire world does business”
(Ver in Popper, 2015, p 130). This is the “future universal cur-
rency, as science ﬁction had promised” (Popper, 2015, p 142); it
“will change the entire world in a decade” (Popper, 2015, p 149);
and “Bitcoin is the ﬁrst time in ﬁve thousand years that we have
something better than gold” (Popper, 2015, p 220). Finally, “[a]
decentralised, anonymous, self-verifying and completely reliable
register of this sort is the biggest potential change to the money
system since the Medici. It’s banking without banks, and money
without money” (Lanchester, 2016, p 8) Taken at face value then,
on the one hand, there is interesting potential to be explored in
bitcoin and a challenge to established ﬁnancial power. On the
other hand, this might all be merely “myopic technological uto-
pianism” (Golumbia, 2016, p 42) or a deliberate attempt to talk up
a venture capital investment.10
Perhaps the apogee of bitcoin discourse is presented by ideo-
logue Kelly (2015) in The Bitcoin Big Bang: How Alternative
Currencies Are About to Change the World. Bitcoin discourse
gains its evangelical zeal and its “euphoria stems from the rea-
lisation that Bitcoin could be the vehicle that transforms the
ﬁnancial system from centralised to decentralised” (Kelly, 2015, p
59) Kelly proclaims that, “[a] decentralised system is superior to
the centralised system when preventing a failure at the hub is
essential. There remains a risk that multiple hubs fail at the same
time, but it is a step forward in the evolution of systems” (Kelly,
2015, p 67) This mirrors the discussion of decentralised networks
instigated by Baran which I discuss further below. Instead of
decentralisation being considered as based upon a geopolitical
decision, being a contingent choice, serving a speciﬁc historical
function, and with appropriate cost-analysis, it is claimed to be
“superior,” and indeed, a “step forward in the evolution of sys-
tems.” The ideological process of universalising and naturalising
that which is cultural and speciﬁc is achieved by positing
decentralization as partaking in evolution and natural selection.
The idea of technological change as quasi-autonomous, driven by
some process of autopoiesis or self-organisation, “allows many
aspects of contemporary social reality to be accepted as necessary,
unalterable circumstances, akin to facts of nature” (Crary, 2014, p
36) In this way bitcoin and digital discourse “naturalizes, theo-
logizes and teleologizes network technology” (Fisher, 2010, p
185). This discourse considers progress due to network technol-
ogy as being a natural law and inevitable. Digital discourse
thereby “neglects negative aspects of technology and society and
provides a profoundly undialectical picture of the Internet and
society” (Fisher, 2010, p 209) The consequence, for Fisher, is that
digital discourse depoliticizes and neutralises the relation of
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technology and society. It is seen as something that the social
should serve rather than serving the social.
There are examples of how, like other digital intermediaries,
bitcoin enthusiasts must discursively frame their services and
technologies as the march of progress, as superior, natural, and
inevitable. They must also lay out a cultural imaginary within
which their service makes sense (Wyatt, 2004). In the digital
cultural imaginary, it is essentially compulsory that the individual
be on-line, consuming, gambling, gaming, working, blogging,
downloading, or texting 24/7: “since no moment, place, or
situation now exists in which one can not shop, consume, or
exploit networked resources, there is a relentless incursion of the
non-time of 24/7 into every aspect of social or personal life”
(Crary, 2014, p 30). Bitcoin, with its ethos of ultra-fast and
smooth transactions, partakes of this 24/7 instantaneous ima-
ginary. The digital cultural imaginary both fosters and requires
“nodal citizenship” and “nodal consumption.” For Bolimer, “nodal
citizenship” is Deleuzian control, and Foucauldian govern-
mentality of the self. Digital culture is not simply just a set of
technological platforms or devices, but normalises certain beha-
viours, and carries speciﬁcations for “the proper conduct one
should internalise in a world deﬁned by network technologies…in
which the maintenance of connections and perpetuation of ﬂows
is the task of a good ‘citizen,’ especially as embodied by the
materiality of network technology” (Bolimer, 2016, p 6). During
Fordism, technology discourse and the cultural imaginary legiti-
mated the interventionist welfare state, central planning in busi-
ness and the economy, the hierarchized coroporation, and the
tenured worker. However, during ﬁnancialization and our con-
temporary, post-Fordist society, technological discourse and the
cultural imaginary legitimates instead, “the withdrawal of the state
from markets, the globalization of the economy, the dehier-
archization and decentralization of business, and the ﬂexibiliza-
tion of production and the labour process” (Fisher, 2010, p 3).
Such a cultural imaginary is one in which centralization is
deemed an impediment to the decentralised ﬂow of neoliberal
ﬁnance. All government, especially centralised government is
deemed oppressive, all central banks are rotten, ﬁnance and
consumption must face no temporal or spatial limit, and freedom
is freedom to engage smoothly in markets and neoliberalism and
not freedom from markets and neoliberalism. In such bitcoin
discourse several tropes come together—libertarian tropes from
Nakamoto such as no need to “trust” government or banks,
techno-utopian tropes such as efﬁciency, speed, connectivity, and
cyber-anarchist tropes such as freedom, decentralization, dis-
tribution, and anonymity. Bitcoin’s social and cultural imaginary
is one in which government and banks cannot ever be trusted,
where digital technology is always empowering, and where
decentralized individual anonymity is preferred to collective
recognition of social identity. Any form of regulation, law, cen-
tralisation, organisation, and collectivity, is rendered politically
problematic and invisible to this imaginary. Such notions are
considered big government interference, the road to serfdom, and
an obstacle to be overcome. The corporation, neoliberalism, the
free market, and economic power however, apparently need no
check on their own trustworthiness, centralisation, growth and
consolidation.
As Gillespie has shown with the notion of “platform”11
regarding Facebook, a term such as “decentralised,” (or “dis-
tributed,” or “ﬁnancial ﬂow,” or “trust”) in bitcoin discourse can
become a “discursive resting point” (Gillespie, 2010, p 350) that
conceals and elides various tensions. Further innovations may be
oriented towards that idea of how technology is to function in the
social and cultural imaginary. Such terms “institute” a way of
being: as Bourdieu puts it, they “sanction and sanctify a particular
state of things, an established order, in exactly the same way that
a constitution does in the legal and political sense of the term”
(Bourdieu in Gillespie, 2010, p 350). In bringing together ideas of
decentralisation, digital utopianism, and technological progress,
right-wing libertarian ideology sets and shapes public discourse
around digital currencies: “These terms and claims get further
established, reiﬁed, and enforced as they are taken up and given
legitimacy inside authoritative discourses such as law, policy, and
jurisprudence” (Gillespie, 2010, p 356) This discourse maps onto
recent enthusiasm for user-generated content, amateur expertise,
popular creativity, peer-level social networking, and online
commentary. Aside long-standing rhetoric about the alleged
democratizing potential of the Internet, bitcoin rhetoric is like
much digital discourse with connotations of “open, neutral, ega-
litarian, and progressive support for activity” that accompany the
notion ‘platform’ as Gillespie has identiﬁed (Gillespie, 2010, p
353). This discourse functions to make the terms compelling for
digital intermediaries to appeal to users, especially in contrast to
traditional mass media or, in the case of bitcoin, traditional
economic institutions. However, despite the promises made,
“ 'platforms’ are more like traditional media than they care to
admit…And the discourse of the ‘platform’ works against us
developing such precision, offering as it does a comforting sense
of technical neutrality and progressive openness” (Gillespie, 2010,
p 360) Likewise, as shall be argued, decentred ﬁnancial networks
function more like traditional ﬁnancial powerhouses and operate
in line with the power structures of centralized networks. There is
no neat ideological ﬁt between the digital dream of the decen-
tralized, open, participatory web, and the digital reality. Within
such ﬁssures critique can operate.12
Bitcoin discourse and Nakamoto’s white-paper collates into a
series of presuppositions that I would like to begin to pro-
blematize. First, that decentralized networks and free-markets
without regulation or government mediation are fully enabling
and apolitical. I challenge this by emphasising the right-wing
ideology inherent in bitcoin technology and discourse. Second,
there is a valorisation of decentralisation that is in some sense a
progression from centralisation. This notion forgets the archi-
tecture and origins of the internet. It also omits the threats to
decentralisation such as the virus and hacking. Finally, there is a
utopian sensibility around the network that does not consider the
problems of networks. I suggest this is a form of network-
fetishism.13
Bitcoin as right-wing ideology
Much of the digital economy has right-wing origins whether these
are made explicit or eschewed. At one stage, Uber’s Travis
Kalanick’s Twitter account had the cover of Ayn Rand’s manifesto
The Fountainhead as its avatar (Stone, 2017, p 259). In terms of
bitcoin, Golumbia (2016) presents the clearest vision of its
ideology and politics, and what emerges is the notion of software
as right-wing extremism: “As they are currently conﬁgured, Bit-
coin and the blockchain technology on which it rests satisfy needs
that make sense only in the context of right-wing politics”
(Golumbia, 2016, p 20). The cyberpunks and crypto-anarchists,
inﬂuential upon the development of bitcoin, seem to accept, often
without even appearing to realise it, the far-right, libertarian/
anarcho-capitalist deﬁnition of government, such as, “Ronald
Reagan’s inaugural address of 1981, in which he famously claimed
that ‘government is not the solution to our problem; government
is our problem’ ” (Golumbia, 2016, p 16) The zeal of the cyber-
libertarians towards bitcoin, which might possibly evade gov-
ernment, regulation, and taxation, stems from a belief system that
“links ecstatic enthusiasm for electronically mediated forms of
living with radical, right-wing libertarian ideas about the proper
deﬁnition of freedom, social life, economics and politics”
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(Golumbia, 2016, p 10) Hal Finney, for instance, who received the
ﬁrst bitcoin transaction from Satoshi Nakamoto, imbued “liber-
tarian ideas at Cal Tech and in his reading of the novels of Ayn
Rand” (Popper, 2015, p 23). Gavin Andresen, the lead maintainer
for the original bitcoin client, “had moved toward libertarianism
during his ﬁrst programming job, swayed by a persistent cow-
orker. These politics gave him a natural interest in a free-market
currency like Bitcoin” (Popper, 2015, p 68). In proposing that
bitcoin escapes the issue of inﬂation, much bitcoin discourse,
“takes up the simplistic far-right version of [Milton] Friedman’s
contention that inﬂation is just another name for the ‘printing of
money’ by central banks” (Golumbia, 2016, p 28) In essence,
bitcoin originated from, and is a common preoccupation of the
libertarian pro-tech, radical right.
Decentralization and its discontents
Bitcoin is celebrated as utilising a decentred network in a way that
purportedly challenges centralisation. Decentralized networks are
deemed a natural progression over centralised networks. Such
claims often ignore the historical architecture of the internet. Paul
Baran is cited by Berners-Lee as one of three individuals
responsible for the development of the “general communications
infrastructure that links computers together, on top of which the
Web rides” (Berners-Lee, 1999, p 6). Baran’s (1962) “On Dis-
tributed Communication Networks” contributed to the “early
research [that] would eventually develop into the internet”
(Bolimer, 2016, p 99). Baran14 discusses three types of network:
centralized, decentralized, and distributed.15 Communication in a
centralized network is vulnerable, Baran suggests, because “[d]
estruction of the central node destroys intercommunication
between the end stations” (Baran, 1962, p 3). Preferable then, in
this scenario, would be a decentralised network, “because com-
plete reliance upon a single point is not always required” (Baran,
1962, p 3). Baran was writing, as he puts it, in the “thermonuclear
era…that must anticipate a worst-case destruction” (Baran, 1962,
p 18). The discussion of networks, informing what we now
understand as the Internet, is founded on geopolitical antagon-
ism16 and the paranoia of nuclear war: “The network must be
built with the expectation of heavy damage” (Baran, 1962, p 19).
A decentralized network, with no central node that can be
destroyed, will allow military communication to be maintained.
This will allow the US to return nuclear ﬁre17 and lead to
mutually assured destruction. This conﬁrms the often overlooked
or unacknowledged, “relationship the internet’s development has
with fears of nuclear war” (Bolimer, 2016, p 99). Also factored
into the development of the Internet by Baran is the cost-analysis
of the capitalist middle-manager: “In choosing the communica-
tion links of the future, digital links appear increasingly attractive
by permitting low cost switching and low cost links” (Baran, 1962,
p 18). Baran’s model negotiated the numerous contradictory
historical attributes of networks to “invent a structure that was
all-encompassing, restrictive, and potentially totalizing while
simultaneously weak, ﬂuid and ﬂexible” (Bolimer, 2016, p 100). In
summation, the creation of a cheap, and therefore weak network
designed to maintain US military communication in the case of
nuclear war has been adapted18 and adopted to inﬂuence the
architecture of what we now know as the Internet.19
Whilst decentralization, in its response to a perceived threat,
has facilitated certain elements of electronic communication it
also opens a new problem: the computer virus. The possible
threat to a centralized node may have been somewhat alleviated
but this does not create security, instead the threat simply changes
location. The decentralized multiple and weak nodes are now
made vulnerable to viruses, worms, hacking, cyberterrorism,
anomalies, accidents, assemblages, contagions, and so forth. The
“solution” of decentralisation creates its own new problems and
threats. The very nature of a decentralised network with multiple
weak nodes and packet-switching produces the perfect environ-
ment for a virus to spread and hacking to occur. Packet-switching
is a mode of data transmission in which a message is broken into
a number of parts which are sent independently, over whatever
route is optimum for each packet, and reassembled at the desti-
nation. This is championed in Baran’s network, and introduces
local intelligence to communications. Instead of being controlled
from above from a centralised, hierarchical position, network
communications decentralised control into small packets which
ﬁnd their own way from sender to recipient. The basic archi-
tecture of the Internet has been based on data that is intelligent in
the sense that it contains its own instructions for moving, using
networks to accomplish its operations: “In this sense, we can
justiﬁably claim that the origins of worm-like—and partly virus-
like—programs lie in the schematics of network computing in
general” (Parikka, 2005). Viruses, hacking, and so forth, cannot be
eliminated so long as the ontology of network culture is viral-like.
The computer virus “thrives on the openness of info-space…
thrives on the inﬁnite potential of algorithmic computing; the
open, ﬂexible and undecidable grammar of the algorithm allows
the virus to spread, infect and evolve” (Sampson, 2004). Decen-
tralization has given birth to “the anarchic virus [which] is
without a central agency; it is a profound rejection of all Generals
and power centres” (Sampson, 2004). What was once proposed as
a solution—of sorts—to the supposed problem of the cen-
tralization of networks has thrown up its own problems in terms
of the virus and hacking. Bitcoin itself “is always one big hack
away from total failure” (Popper, 2015, p 13). On 19 June 2011,
when a bitcoin exchange platform was hacked—administrators
had needed only a single password to log in20 —bitcoin fell in
value from $17 to 1 cent in less than an hour (Popper, 2015,
p 129).
Network fetishism
Networks are often fetishised, presented and assumed to be
decentred and democratic because they supposedly exist without
central command. This is supposed to facilitate non-hegemonic,
noncoercive, individualistic freedom of movement, while
encouraging some kind of distributed representation and
engagement. To this utopian vision we have become increasingly
suspicious: “Don’t we know now that networks also produce
stoppages, closures, dark spots, and their own particular forms
of control and governance?” (Aranda et al., 2015, p 7) Further
possible problems, and the poverty, of decentred networks are
outlined by Berry (2008). A new form of social organisation is
developing in relation to the network and networks are cele-
brated as being “decentred, limitless and often, it is claimed,
non-hierarchical and structureless forms or ﬂuid organizations”
(Berry, 2008, p 365). It follows that a distinction is made
between two apparently antagonistic economic, social and
technological forms: “industrial hierarchical mass production vs.
peer-produced decentralized network production” (Berry, 2008,
p 371). In this scheme a new priority is given to “ownership of
the immaterial—software, algorithms, patents and copyright—
that will determine the shape of the new age” (Berry, 2008,
p 370). It is here, however, that Berry argues that we see the
emergence of a problematic binary—material/immaterial—and
that even “something as ephemeral as software has a concrete
materiality which problematizes this distinction” (Berry, 2008,
p 370). It is the case that the amount of power consumed by
blockchain operations is so large that it has been suggested that
bitcoin itself is “unsustainable” (Malmo in Golumbia, 2016,
p 43). The materiality of the network, and the exploitative
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relations inherent in such materiality, are a blind-spot in
network fetishism.
Trouble continues when we forget that the network models and
diagrams we use are generative of a real yet to come,21 when we
think that the world conforms to our digital models and algo-
rithms22, or when, “we attempt to remake the world in terms of
our network theories” (Berry, 2008, p 365). These models are
simpliﬁcations of the world: “The network is not ontological it is
analytical, and as such it is restricted in how much it can tell us
and how useful it can be” (Berry, 2008, p 365). The problem is
that “the existence of networks invites us to think in a manner
that is appropriate to networks” (Berry, 2008, p 366). Networks
privilege the connected, as the unconnected—by deﬁnition—are
not within the network. They distort a reading of reality that
highlights synchronic dispersal over diachronic unfolding. In this
sense, networks “abolish history and shift our focus to the event,
the happening or the now” (Berry, 2008, p 366). The idea of the
decentred network remains only “a spatial diagram which pro-
vides topological information about the nodes that are connected
with it” (Berry, 2008, p 371). Crucially, “it ﬂattens reality and
removes the distinctions between different nodes” (Berry, 2008, p
371). This means that in a network “an individual programmer
and a multinational corporation become equal as connected
nodes in the network” (Berry, 2008, p 371). What looks equal,
democratic, and decentred in the diagram of the network, with
simple links and lines of connectivity between indistinguishable
nodes, conceals a massive distortion of power and power rela-
tions. Here we might make a distinction between the network and
the node in the way that Bruno Latour, in philosophical discus-
sion with Peter Sloterdijk, makes a distinction between the net-
work and the sphere.23 Unlike networks, “spheres are not anemic,
not just points and links, but complex ecosystems” (Latour, 2015,
p 41). Likewise, nodes must be considered as complex ecosystems
behind the apparent simplicity of points, links, and lines of dia-
grammatic representation. Decentralized network fetishism con-
ceals relations and systems of domination, exploitation, and
alienation. This is arguably what has happened with bitcoin.
There is an illusion of circumventing economic power with
decentralised nodes but what has emerged upon closer scrutiny is
the corporate occupation of cyberspace in powerful and deep
nodes.
Another bitcoin obituary
In its ﬁrst few years, bitcoin was a digital cottage industry run by
hobbyists and “the technology was still essentially just a volunteer
project that relied on the goodwill of users” (Popper, 2015, p 67).
Bitcoin could be mined by relatively fast home computers acting
as relatively equal nodes in a decentralised network. Today,
however, most successful mining is done by pools of dedicated
high-power systems in a sign of increasing nodal power and
capital colonisation of the internet. It is this nodal power that
network fetishism is blind to. As Golumbia suggests, this fact
alone “has raised signiﬁcant questions about Bitcoins claim to
‘democratise’ or ‘decentralise’ currency operations” (Golumbia,
2016, p 43). This also makes the Bitcoin system exposed to the '51
percent problem’: if one node or cluster of nodes owns more than
51 percent of the mining operations it could, at least theoretically,
“change the rules of Bitcoin at any time” (Golumbia, 2016, p 43).
There are also debates24 around bitcoin “forks”—in open source
software development terms, a possible shift to a new version.
These problems indicate that bitcoin is not as decentralised as it
imagines: “Bitcoin’s own governance structures displayed exactly
the autocracy, inﬁghting, bad faith, and centralisation that the
blockchain is often said to have magically dissolved” (Golumbia,
2016, p 101) In essence, the promise of decentralisation has not
been kept and network fetishism has concealed the fact that
certain nodes function as centralised power bases.
Has bitcoin succeeded, or hinted at potential, in becoming
digital money? At a most basic level, money25 is typically held by
economists to have three prime functions: it serves as an
accounting unit, it has exchange-value (it serves as a medium of
exchange), and it has a use-value (it can store wealth). Bitcoin is
arguably so well-known because of its volatility—its price has
ﬂuctuated wildly, and it is open to derivation and speculation.26
There is, at present, no stability, which makes it hard to consider
bitcoin a secure store of value in the way that modulated gold
might store value, or even the way that ﬁat money (regulated by
the state), which bitcoin was promoted to replace, might store
wealth. Bitcoin’s very lack of regulation, and openness to the
whim of the market—again, something that was championed—
ensures a volatility that prevents the stability necessary to store
wealth or, indeed, act as a unit of account. The fact that bitcoin
largely “ﬂoats free of any anchor to ordinary valuing processes”
(Golumbia, 2016, p 71). means that it cannot fully function as a
stable accounting unit.27 In 2014 Goldman-Sachs announced that
“Our best deﬁnition would be that it is currently a speculative
ﬁnancial asset that can be used as a medium of exchange”28 Most
accounts of Bitcoin, such as Brian Kelly’s The Bitcoin Big Bang,
ignore the other functions of money and reduce money to cur-
rency only. Early on, the pseudonymous nature of Bitcoin made it
the currency of choice for illegal activity on Silk Road, a dark web
vending site, using the anonymity software Tor. This may well be
its legacy: for a short time facilitating illegal activity and the
dissemination of drugs, weapons, and dubious pornography. It is
as a speculative ﬁnancial asset that the volatility of bitcoin can be
understood. Like any Ponzi scheme, the investment must be
constantly talked-up, the bubble inﬂated, and this allows under-
standing of much of the hyperbole of bitcoin discourse.
There has been hope in some quarters that bitcoin as digital
money, peer-to-peer, with encryption, would be taken up and
replace, or compete, with the likes of PayPal. However, this has
not been the case. On the horizon for bitcoin is the attempt by the
likes of Apple, Google, and Facebook to become payment plat-
forms. They will, like bitcoin, collect a small fee for transactions,
but they will also, crucially unlike bitcoin, obtain the data that
goes along with the transaction. Data is the new “kind of raw
material” (Srnicek, 2017, p 38) of the digital economy that is being
extracted and exploited. The current strong position these house-
hold name platforms have, as well as the business model of
extracting more data, will see one or more of them attract enough
investment and venture capital to fund a “growth before proﬁts”
model (Srnicek, 2017, p 20). This will raise use and activity, and
eventually begin to monopolise the actions and transactions of
the digital economy. In this proposed scenario, and with com-
petition from other digital monies such as Ethereum, Dogecoin,
and Litecoin—which purport to improve upon bitcoin’s inefﬁ-
ciencies—bitcoin is likely to be unable to compete. There may
well be a bursting of the bitcoin bubble, or long drawn out
deﬂation, and all that will be remembered is likely to be an early
innovative experiment in cryptocurrency.
The bitcoin obituary is almost a genre of its own.29 In response
to the failure of bitcoin, at least in terms of its own original
ambition, new Silicon Valley advocates began arguing in 2014
that the signiﬁcant technological development was not, as
Nakamoto initially intended, a network that allowed participants
to make anonymous transactions outside the reach of the gov-
ernment and banking system, but rather digital cryptology and
distributed ledger technologies. It is ironic that centralised gov-
ernments and banks are now taking opportunity of this digital
technology to increase their control and power in a way that goes
against the ethos of early bitcoin ideology. In 2016, the UK
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government’s chief scientiﬁc adviser issued a report which said
that distributed ledger technologies “have the potential to help
governments to collect taxes, deliver beneﬁts, issue passports,
record land registries, assure the supply chain of goods and
generally ensure the integrity of government records and services”
(Lanchester, 2016, p 11). It is thought that the blockchain can be
adapted to do this with lower friction, lower cost, and higher
security than any existing system. The use of the blockchain,
albeit not in its original bitcoin form, has naturally attracted the
attention of the banks. Financial institutions, whose centralisation
bitcoin was originally intended to subvert, are going to use this
new technology to maintain their power and keep themselves
right where they are: “in the middle of every possible transaction
network, extracting all the rent they can” (Lanchester, 2016, p 12).
Far from weakening government, the banks, and transforming
business, the irony and cautionary tale of bitcoin is that these
enterprises are likely to be empowered by the digital technology
that bitcoin inaugurated. In terms of wider social implications,
DuPont has argued that cryptography is a new weapon in the
Deleuzian control society: “controlling economics through the
ordering application of Bitcoin” (DuPont, 2014). The digital
economy has not seen the end of ownership and power but rather
the concentration of property and power. In the future, one might
have to modify Marx and Engels’ famous slogan somewhat:
“Decentred digital networkers of the world, unite! You have
nothing to lose but your blockchains!”
Conclusion, bitcoin, the commons, and collectivization
Can bitcoin and its technology have a more progressive future?
One such claim is made In The Real World of the Decentralized
Autonomous Society, where Garrod (2016) investigates the
notion, celebrated by its enthusiasts, that bitcoin represents the
coming of a decentralized autonomous society in which humans
are free from centralised forms of power and control. Garrod is
rightly critical of certain elements of this notion insofar as
“freedom” and autonomy here is conceived of as only “freedom”
and autonomy from the supposed tyranny of the state, not
‘freedom’ from, for instance, the tyranny of the market. Bitcoin
discourse, “neglects the power that capital holds over us” (Garrod,
2016, p 62) Despite this criticism Garrod proposes that something
can be saved from the bitcoin experiment in digital decen-
tralization and utilised on the Left or for the Commons. Based on
the model of bitcoin technology, it may be “possible to create
distributed collaborative organizations or ‘open co-operativism’ ”
(Garrod, 2016, p 73). This could be used to help smaller, regional
areas protect their own commons—whether they be in the form
of healthcare, education, water, air, Internet, knowledge, and so
on. In Garrod’s scenario, there is the possibility of harnessing
reactionary technology for progressive aims, that is, taking bitcoin
and its technology outside of its neoliberal emergence and context
to forward the aims of the Left and serve the Commons.30 With
appropriate caution, Garrod claims that bitcoin can “provide the
basis for progressive human development” (Garrod, 2016, p 74).
It is agreeable that one must challenge oppressive structures
and technological practices, but what if one is employing the
technology and tools of the oppressor,31 and that these tools
transform and distort the holder in their application?32 Has a
technology that was developed to serve the interests of the poli-
tical right ever been successfully recuperated by the left?33 At least
these are concerns worth raising. The discourse around utilization
of digital cryptology appears to be dominated by issues sur-
rounding the protection of wealth and security of private property
—is this compatible with the aims of the Left and the Commons?
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to the progressive possibilities of
bitcoin technology is that bitcoin digital decentralisation is a
thoroughly ideological and neoliberal notion, both in terms of its
infrastructure and as a product of technology. As Golumbia has
it, “political values are very literally coded into the [bitcoin]
software itself” (Golumbia, 2016, p 102). If there is to be a pro-
gressive employment of this digital technology, then this code and
software will need much reconsideration.
Ultimately it may only be the humanization34 and collectivi-
zation of the Internet that sees true progressive values being met.
“Perhaps today we must collectivise the platforms,” suggests
Srnicek (2017, p 127) and Golumbia argues that what is required
to combat power “is not more wars between algorithmic plat-
forms and individuals who see themselves as above politics, but a
reassertion of the political power that the blockchain is speciﬁ-
cally constructed to dismantle” (Golumbia, 2016, p 102). A
reafﬁrmation and resurgence of organised assembly, public con-
trolled and collective power to govern and regulate certain ele-
ments of the digital economy could lead to the breaking up of
digital monopolies, regulate business practices, ban exploitative
“lean platform” employment conditions, impose new privacy
controls, coordinate action on tax avoidance, liberate us from the
tyranny of markets, and begin to place capital and power into
public hands. Long-term egalitarian goals and progressive poli-
tical objectives can come from the collective, rather than a
designated centralised ﬁgurehead. All the while monitoring and
mitigating the worst excesses of State power, and being inde-
pendent of the “surveillance state apparatus” (Srnicek, 2017, p
127). This is ambitious of course, but would see the true pro-
gressive potential of the Internet ﬁnally in sight.
Received: 20 August 2017 Accepted: 15 January 2018
Notes
1 The word bitcoin is a compound of bit and coin. While some sources capitalise
bitcoin to distinguish between bitcoin as a technology and network and bitcoin as a
unit of account, the OED advocates use of lowercase in all cases.
2 In typical cyber-utopian discourse, Stone (2017) proposes that digital technological
giants such as Uber and Airbnb and the broad business model that is being replicated
—“Uberiﬁcation”—are “changing the world”, are the “new architects of the 21st
century”, and yield as much power as the world’s political leaders. These ﬂedgling
Silicon Valley start-ups have risen to global dominance, largely by being sustained by
venture capital, circumnavigating—disrupting—established legal requirements, and
ironically by (ab)using popular support to overcome regulators and “outdated” laws.
The branding of Uber as “effortless” and “seamless” has persuaded people that private
transport is preferable to public transport, and Airbnb through the marketing of
“connectivity” and “community” have promoted private ownership and private
collection of rent over social housing. The capitalist-consumer replaces the citizen is
now an entrepreneur of their own capital, space, and time. Peer-to-peer networking
has undoubtedly transformed the holiday rental and taxi markets for many people
worldwide, and will further transform it once monopoly status is attained. For all
their ultra-modern ethos and purported mastery of data and technology there
remains a harsh, classic capitalist, business-as-usual procedure behind the scenes of
this growth. Uber’s Travis Kalanick, for a time, Donald Trump’s Strategic and Policy
Forum corporate adviser, is portrayed by Stone as openly aggressive, disdainfully
turning his chair to face away in a regulation meeting, suggests his rivals are likely to
fail by becoming “doomed by civility”, and “chronic niceness”. Ethics and idealism, in
the digital economy, are cited as being “deadly” ﬂaws in e-business (Stone, 2017). In
attempting to bypass regulations Airbnb and Uber have been accused of failing to
alert hosts and drivers to their legal responsibilities, facilitate the precarious “gig-
economy”, provide no employment rights and remedies, and both are “tax-skimmers”
making proﬁts by dodging rules, taxes, and licensing fees that apply to their
traditional rivals. It is claimed that once basic worker rights are given to employees
that these are economically unsustainable businesses (Srnicek, 2017, p 118). They
remain propped up and aﬂoat due to short-term venture capital investment which
seeks a long-term return once monopoly conditions are attained. In this global digital
economy, much of the West’s apparent afﬂuence comes from outsourcing and
exploitation of the “third-world”. In considering practises such as cobalt mining in
Congo and the Foxconn / Apple sweatshops in China, Qiu (2016) persuasively
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introduces the notion of the iSlave and proposes parallels between the digital
economy and Atlantic slavery. The comparison between Uber and bitcoin can only
go so far. It is accepted that Uber is not a peer to peer matching system for unused
capacity of cars and passengers trying to get from A to B, but rather a quite
centralized and powerful platform orchestrated by a company with designs on
monopoly and the displacement of its network of drivers by autonomous vehicles.
3 Tim Berners-Lee, so-called inventor of the World Wide Web, wrote in 1999, “We
certainly need a structure that will avoid those two catastrophes: the global uniform
McDonald’s monoculture, and the isolated Heaven’s Gate cults that understand only
themselves.” (Berners-Lee, 1999, p 203) Unfortunately, Berners–Lee ambiition has
not been met. Given the corporate colonisation of the internet on the one hand and
the inevitable end of “net neutrality,” and the emergence of the “alt right” and
dissemination of “fake news” on the other, both catastrophes have occurred. The
decentred nature of the Internet has meant no centralised resistance, such as the
State, to the corporation and no centralised pedagogic or moral resistance to the “alt
right” or duplicitous content.
4 Satoshi Nakamoto is the pseudonym of the individual or collective responsible for the
initial design and development of bitcoin, and who disseminated the “white paper”
Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (Nakamoto, 2008). Bitcoin, itself, is
pseudonymous. It is not anonymous since every transaction is recorded, “but
determining the true identities of those involved in the transactions requires more
information than is directly available in the network” (Golumbia, 2016, p 39).
5 Zimmer explores both the metaphor and literalism of the notion of bitcoin mining,
making connection with previous metalist currency regimes. Zimmer proposes a
historical comparison with colonial South American silver mining and the global
currency regime based on the New World silver peso it created. Zimmer foregrounds
an historical and political understanding of bitcoin’s stakes, including questions of
resources, labour, energy, and ecology. Traditional mining and the attendant
extractive apparatus always implies massive-scale earthworks that reshape the planet
itself, a process known as terraforming. Zimmer concludes that this comparison
reveals bitcoin to form part of a similar process of digital primitive accumulation that
he provisionally names cryptoforming. In the process Zimmer shows how, despite all
the talk of decentralization, bitcoin is reproducing the pattern of mining in general,
which is towards centralisation, as witnessed in the bitcoin mining consolidation of
the recent past.
6 However, with the full record of transactions on the blockchain, “it was often possible
to identify the people involved in transactions, or at least more possible that it was
with transactions involving cash” (Popper, 2015, p 343).
7 Financialisation signals the transition from the Fordist mode of production to
ﬁnancial capitalism and the attempt to recover what capital could no longer get in the
real economy in ﬁnancial markets. (Marazzi, 2011) In the 1950s ﬁnancial concerns
made up 4% of total corporate proﬁts by 2006 this had increased to account for 40%
of such proﬁts, intensiﬁed by developments in digital technology. In the 1970s and
1980s, nonﬁnancial ﬁrms increased their investment in ﬁnancial assets relative to that
in plants and equipment. In a subversion of the Fordist norm, they became
increasingly dependent on immaterial ﬁnancial sources of revenue and proﬁt relative
to that earned from productive activities. The implications of this immaterial hyper-
real economy free from the real material economy, is the autonomisation of ﬁnancial
capital from real interests such as land, machinery, labour, and stock. Investment in
production is no longer attractively proﬁtable, so capital is redirected to ﬁnancial
markets where a stronger return is promised: this is stock managerial capitalism. This
intensiﬁed in the under-regulated, under scrutised, distribution of sub-prime loans,
and derivatives based on these loans, which when they could not be paid back,
resulted in a crash.
8 http://www.righto.com/2014/02/ascii-bernanke-wikileaks-photographs.html
[Accessed 1 April 2017].
9 Maurer et al. consider that bitcoin represents a promise like any other money form,
“but a promise underwritten and backed by an algorithm and its manifestation in a
digital peer-to-peer network” (Maurer et al., 2013, p 274). Despite what they call the
“practical materialism” of bitcoin, Maurer et al, indicate that the “social dynamics of
community and trust” are still evident in “the prose and poetry produced by Bitcoin
users” (Maurer et al., 2013, p 262). They remind that, certainly in the early days,
bitcoin combined “a practical materialism with a politics of community and trust that
puts the code front and center” (Maurer et al., 2013, p 63). For them, this is a trust in
the code that “substitutes for the (socially and politically constituted) credibility of
persons, institutions, and governments. It is this—not the anonymity or the
cryptography or the economics—that makes Bitcoin novel in the long conversation
about the nature of money” (Maurer et al., 2013, p 263). Ultimately, in early bitcoin,
“trust in the code does not erase entirely the community that bestows it” (Maurer
et al., 2013, p 274). Whether one can talk of such a community nowadays is
debatable.
10 During the dot-com bubble the average size of venture capital deals quadrupled
between 1996 and 2000 when investors sought future proﬁtability in adopting a
“growth before proﬁts” model. This model seeks “to grab market share and eventually
dominate…aiming for monopolistic dominance” (Srnicek, 2017, p 20) More recently,
technology companies have been particularly keen to make venture capital
investment. These companies only need to move intellectual property rather that
materials like factories to different tax jurisdictions to facilitate tax evasion. Therefore,
they have been left “with a vast amount of money to invest” (Srnicek, 2017, p 32).
11 “The term ‘platform’ helps reveal how YouTube and others stage themselves for these
constituencies, allowing them to make a broadly progressive sales pitch while also
eliding the tensions inherent in their service: between user-generated and
commercially produced content, between cultivating community and serving up
advertising, between intervening in the delivery of content and remaining neutral”
(Gillespie, 2010, p 350).
12 My approach here is informed by Critical Internet Theory/Studies. Elmer (2002)
proposed three characteristics of Critical Internet Studies: the refutation and
questioning of ideologies that claim the Internet is revolutionary, the analysis of the
process of Internet corporatisation, and the focus on radical possibilities of the critical
Internet community especially in the cracks, ﬁssures, and holes in the forms of
domination that characterise the Internet. Following on from this, Fuchs deﬁnes
Critical Internet Theory/Studies and the Critique of the Political Economy of the
Internet as an approach that engages in “identifying and analysing antagonisms in the
relationship of the Internet and society; it shows how the Internet is shaped and
shapes the colliding forces of competition and cooperation; it is oriented towards
showing how domination and exploitation are structured and structuring the Internet
and on how class formation and potential class struggles are technologically
mediated; it identiﬁes Internet-supported, not yet realized potentials of societal
development and radically questions structures that restrain human and societal
potentials for cooperation, self-determination, participation, happiness and self-
management” (Fuchs, 2009, p 75).
13 That is, an application and myopic understanding of the decentralised network
without taking into account its historical formation and architecture, its politics (on
both a local and global level), underlying ideologies, and problematic mode of
production. Further, it is a view which accepts fully utopian notions of the entwining
of technology and progress. It is argued that bitcoin is vulnerable to such an
approach. As in the classic study of commodity fetishism, bitcoin pioneers promoted
the decentralised network’s appearance as an autonomous ﬁgure endowed with a life
of its own. In this case, the network functioned as a mask that conceals economic, and
other, exploitation.
14 It can be suggested that Baran anticipates the Internet(work) in passages such as, “we
would like to consider the interconnection, 1 day, of many all-digital links to provide
a resource optimized for the handling of data for many potential intermittent users—
a new common-user system” (Baran, 1962 p 23).
15 Decentralized and distributed networks are often conﬂated to stand in opposition to
centralized networks in discussions of bitcoin.
16 One might mention here the work of Friedrich Hayek—a foundational source for the
right and neoliberalism. His attack on any form of centralised government
(particularly one involved in regulation and central planning, such as the Soviet
Union) and political promotion of decentralisation (deregulated market competition)
was likewise informed by fears—illusory or not—of a Soviet threat. One argument
Hayek proposed was that in centrally planned economies an individual or a select
group must determine the distribution of resources. However, argues Hayek, these
planners will never have enough information to carry out this allocation reliably. For
Hayek only the free market, through the price mechanism, can efﬁciently maintain
exchange and the use of resources. Today, it can be counter-argued that, in principle,
digital technology and data afford better centralised analysis of exchange and
distribution of resources than the decentred market alone could possibly offer.
17 The decentred network inﬂuenced U.S. nuclear military design. As Schlosser explains,
nuclear silos could be dispersed “widely throughout the Great Plains, so that a
surprise attack by the Soviet Union couldn’t easily destroy them all. In Montana, the
new launch sites were built in an area extending for 14,000 square miles” (Schlosser,
2015, p 30). Crucially, however, the decentred network might alleviate one concern—
vulnerability of a central node—but in turn creates a new vulnerability of
decentralised multiple and weak nodes. Schlosser insightfully adds that, “Decisions
made for reasons of efﬁciency and military strategy in the twentieth century couldn’t
anticipate the implications for nuclear terrorism in the twenty-ﬁrst” (Schlosser, 2015,
p 31). For instance, Pakistan “has the world’s fastest-growing nuclear arsenal. It has
dispersed nuclear weapons to multiple locations, making them less vulnerable to
destruction by a foreign nation but more vulnerable to theft by terrorists” (Schlosser,
2015, p 74). The network is also necessarily vulnerable to leaks, hacking, and so forth.
Edward Snowden gained access to the classiﬁed secrets of the National Security
Agency: “The NSA is responsible not only for generating the launch codes for
America’s nuclear-weapons but also for designing the equipment that decrypts the
codes” (Schlosser, 2015, p 50).
18 Strengthening the historical connection between technology and antagonistic
geopolitics, “the early 1990s saw the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and it is no
coincidence that information networks in the United States were transitioned from a
military to an economic function at the same time” (Aranda et al, 2015, p 6).
19 This follows the ideas forwarded by thinkers such as Friedrich Kittler and Paul
Virilio, that the contemporary cultural condition is an essential coupling of war and
media, and the cybernetic logistics of command, control, communications and
intelligence. Strictly military networks extend to, and inﬂuence, the business and
entertainment media.
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20 Similar low-ﬁ security was apparent in July 2011, when the founder of a small Polish
bitcoin exchange, Bitomat, announced he had “accidentally deleted the ﬁles where he
kept the private keys to the Bitcoin addresses at which his customers’ 17,000 Bitcoin
were stored” (Popper, 2015, p 135).
21 “Dispositional expressions and active forms can be spatial softwares, protocols, or
diagrams. A diagram, as Deleuze and Guattari render the idea, is not a
representational sketch of a single arrangement but rather an ‘abstract machine’ that
is generative of a ‘real that is yet to come’ ” (Easterling, 2015, p 37).
22 Mullarkey discusses how Bergson famously scorned the diagrammatic image of a
time as a time-line in a spatialisation of duration. It was threatening “precisely
because lived-time can approach the state of a homogeneous line: we can tend to live
unilinear pyschic-lives. This is the rationalisation behind Time and Free Will—that a
description of life could become a revision of life because descriptions are immanent
to what they describe” (Mullarkey, 2006, p 189).
23 Latour notes that the word “network” has become a ubiquitous designation for
technical infrastructures, social relations, geopolitics, maﬁas, and, of course, our new
life online: “while networks are good at describing long-distance and unexpected
connections starting from local points, [Sloterdijk’s] spheres are useful for describing
local, fragile, and complex ‘atmospheric conditions’… Networks are good at stressing
edges and movements; spheres at highlighting envelopes and wombs” (Latour 2015, p
41). Instead of having to choose between Latour’s actor-network theory and
Sloterdijk’s spherology, Latour announces the notion of what he calls ‘composition’ as
an ambition to “regroup in one term those many bubbles, spheres, [and] networks”
(Latour 2015, p 52).
24 While in principle, anyone could propose changes to the bitcoin protocol, Nakamoto
and a colleague, “were still essentially the only people who could sign off on changes
—and this gave them an unusual amount of power in the system” (Popper 2015, p
92).
25 As Dodd advises, money is a remarkably diverse phenomenon, “there is no common
view of what counts as money in a general sense. There never has been a consensus
about this: the extant literature on money is replete with debates over competing
deﬁnitions” (Dodd, 2014, p 5) Following Keynes, there is debate over money’s
abstract role as money of account versus its properties as a medium of exchange. For
his part, Dodd considers money as a social form. For example, the universal
commodity form (Marx), a claim upon society (Simmel), diffuse social media
(Zelizer), a social technology (Ingram), an instrument of collective memory (Hart), a
generalised symbolic medium (Parsons), a social process of commensuration
(Maurer), and a communal illusion (Karatani) (Dodd, 2014, p 8) One must consider
if bitcoin can be considered in terms of a social form. Dodd proposes that money is
best thought of as “an idea” (Dodd, 2014, p 48) Nakamoto’s use of the term “cash” in
the title of the white paper is evidence of this confusion over deﬁnitions and practices
of money. Nakamoto is predominantly, in the white paper, outlining a currency.
26 Prominent bitcoin advocate Rick Falkvinge, who once claimed that the price of one
bitcoin could eventually be as high as US$1 million, later wrote in September 2013,
that its valuation had become “unwarranted by several orders of magnitude” due to
“illegal price-ﬁxing,” even though “for many Bitcoin enthusiasts, the Bitcoin market’s
unenforceability of government rules is a feature, not a bug” and that in manipulating
the market, some bitcoin traders were engaging in “cheating of some kind, a breaking
of the social contract” (Falkvinge in Golumbia, 2016, p 86). This makes dubious the
bitcoin trust in the digital.
27 Dallyn utilises the conception of market singularities to understand bitcoin’s status as
a volatile ﬁnancial asset. Market singularities are markets for particular goods and
services that are of uncertain and incommensurable value. These singularities
markets have communities of followers and a distinctive belief system. There is
conﬁrmation of the libertarian political belief system that underlies bitcoin’s status
but this is not fully uniﬁed and there are some political tensions within the
community concerning governance and centralisation.
28 https://techcrunch.com/2014/03/12/goldman-sachs-BitCoin-is-not-a-currency/
[Accessed 1 April 2017].
29 There is also the sense that every sentence that begins to be written about bitcoin is
superseded by events before it is even ﬁnished. DigiCash, created by cryptographer
David Chaum by 1990, utilising “Blind Signature Technology,” went bankrupt in
1998. Beenz.com (1998) and Flooz.com (1999), using a virtual cryptocurrency to
assist with consumption, went bust in the 2001 dot-com crash. Bitcoin appears more
durable at present. Over 900 cryptocurrencies have been launched since bitcoin.
30 This ambition is also outlined by Steveri: “If images can be shared and circulated, why
can’t everything else be too? If data moves across screens, so can its material
incarnations move across shop windows and other enclosures. If copyright can be
dodged and called into question, why can’t private property? If one can share a
restaurant dish JPEG on Facebook, why not the real meal? Why not apply fair use to
space, parks, and swimming pools? Why only claim open access to JSTOR and not
MIT—or any school, hospital, or university for that matter? Why shouldn’t data
clouds discharge as storming supermarkets? Why not open-source water, energy, and
Dom Perignon champagne?” (Steyeri 2015, p 22).
31 There is frequent assertion that contemporary technological arrangements are
essentially a neutral set of tools that can be used in many different ways, including in
the service of an emancipatory politics. However, Crary utilises Giorgio Agamben to
refute such claims: “today there is not even a single instant in which the life of
individuals is not modelled, contaminated or controlled by some apparatus…
[Therefore] it is impossible for the subject of an apparatus to use it in the right way.
Those who continue to promote similar arguments are, for their part, the product of
the media apparatus in which they are captured” (Agamben in Crary 2014, p 46).
32 Hoofd (2012) explores an analogous situation whereby digital activism—or the
employment of digital technology—replicates the valorisation of speed, connectivity,
and digital activity of the subject-agent of digital neoliberalism. This may actually
have the outcome of accelerating and strengthening the spin of the digital neoliberal
globe. Political activism means creatively using available tools and material resources,
but it should not entail imagining the tools themselves to have intrinsic redemptive
values.
33 This is the type of critical question, answered with silence, posed by Golumbia in
response to the enthusiasm for bitcoin among those with explicitly left-wing politics:
“My response is to ask two questions analytically prior to this one: ﬁrst, to ask for
accounts of where and how it happened that a technology developed speciﬁcally to
magnify the powers favoured by the political right has mutated so as not to serve
those powers but the forces they oppose; and second, to ask for accounts on economic
and political-economic grounds that proceed from left-wing thought (whether
Marxian or Keynesian) to the need for and utility of Bitcoin” (Golumbia 2016, p 20).
34 “A humanization of the Internet requires a communist Internet in a communist
society, an Internet that is not controlled by the logic of capital and by private proﬁt
making, but an Internet that is controlled by all users, beneﬁts all users and is
grounded in the logic of the information gift that is inexhaustible by consumption
and accessible to all without payments, the logic of common access to technology and
knowledge, common production, common ownership, common control, common
interests beyond class, common beneﬁts—the logic of the commons = the reality of
communism” (Fuchs and Sevignani 2013, p 269).
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